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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 30/ 1982, the Public Service Commission 
(PSC) granted an application by Utah Power & Light Company 
("UP&L" or the "Company"), allowing it to adjust its Energy 
Balancing Account ("EBA") for the period September 1981, 
through August, 1982 (the "Relevant Period"), by transferring 
$6,012,000 (representing approximately one-third of UP&L's 
revenues from non-tariff sales during 1981) from the EBA to its 
general account. The PSC Order was reversed by the Utah 
Supreme Court on May 22, 1986. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
By this Petition, UP&L seeks a rehearing of these 
cases and the decision of the Court: (1) affirming the Order of 
the PSC; or (2) remanding these cases to the PSC for additional 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
1
 In Re Application of Utah Power & Light Co., No. 
82-035-14, slip op. (P.S.C. Utah Dec. 30, 1982), aff'd on 
rehearing. No. 82-035-14, slip op. (P.S.C. Utah July 5, 1983), 
rev'd, Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service 
Commission, Nos. 19361 and 19362, slip op. (Utah May 22, 
1986). The PSC Order dated December 30, 1982, and the PSC 
Order on Rehearing dated July 5, 1983, are collectively 
referred to herein as the "PSC OrderH. The Court's Opinion of 
May 22, 1986, is referred to herein as the "Opinion". 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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i 
STATEMENT OF POINTS OF LAW OR FACT OVERLOOKED 
OR MISAPPREHENDED BY THE COURT 
UP&L claims that the Court's decision overlooks or 
misapprehends the following points of law or fact: ( 
I. THE COURT HAS MISAPPREHENDED UP&L'S ARGUMENT THAT 
THE PSC ORDER DID NOT CONSTITUTE IMPERMISSIBLE 
RETROACTIVE RATEMAKING. 
II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILS TO , 
CONSIDER THE PSC ORDER IN IN RE APPLICATION OF 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, slip op. (P.S.C. 
Utah Aug. 2, 1982). 
III. IF THE COURT CANNOT AFFIRM THE PSC ORDER BECAUSE 
OF INADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW CONCERNING THE EBA, IT SHOULD REMAND THESE 
CASES FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO BE MADE BY THE PSC. 
ARGUMENT 
A petition for rehearing is proper and should be 
granted where the court, in its original opinion, misapprehends 
or overlooks points of law or fact or where the findings and 
conclusions of the court/ board or commission below are 
inadequate or unclear (thereby raising, in each instance, 
questions as to whether a correct result was or could be 
reached) or where it is necessary to correct an injustice in 
the original opinion. See, e.g.. Kirchaestner v. Denver & 
R.G.W.R. Co.. 118 Utah 37, 225 P.2d 754 (1950); Rule 35, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure; 5 C.J.S. Appeals & Errors § 1411. 
-2-
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POINT I 
THE COURT HAS MISAPPREHENDED UP&L'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
PSC ORDER DID NOT CONSTITUTE IMPERMISSIBLE RETROACTIVE 
RATEMAKING. 
A. The Court's Decision Erroneously Characterizes as 
Prohibited "Retroactive Ratemakinaw An Accounting Adiustment 
Designed, As the Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking is 
Designed, To Encourage Efficiency, 
"Before there can be retroactive ratemaking there must 
at least be ratemaking." Southern California Edison Co. v. 
Public Utility Commission, 20 Cal. 3d 813, 576 P.2d 945, 144 
Cal. Reptr. 905 (1978). 
In its Order on Rehearing dated July 5, 1983, the PSC 
stated, inter alia, that "the proposed adjustment is consistent 
with Commission intent that the EBA eliminate inequitable 
results or windfall benefits to either the Company or its 
ratepayers" and that the "proposed adjustment is consistent 
with other adjustments previously and currently made in the 
[Energy Balancing] Account procedure in that all are 
retroactive in nature and none alter the Commission approved 
rate." Order on Rehearing No. 82-035-14 (P.S.C. Utah July 5, 
1983). 
The Court's decision overlooks the rationale behind 
the rule against retroactive ratemaking and erroneously 
characterizes as prohibited "retroactive ratemaking" an 
accounting adjustment designed and intended to avoid the same 
-3-
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thing the rule itself seeks to avoid. As the court recognized, 
the general prohibition against retroactive ratemaking is 
intended Mto provide utilities with some incentive to operate 
efficiently . . . .M Opinion at 2. The PSC Order allowing the 
accounting adjustment in this case is consistent with this 
underlying policy because it encourages efficiency by 
protecting UP&L from being penalized for aggressively marketing 
excess energy production to non-tariff users in an unusual 
situation of abnormally high reduced demand by tariff 
ratepayers where its generating capacity would otherwise remain 
idle. 
The Court misconstrued UP&L's argument that the 
accounting adjustment effected by the PSC Order was not 
retroactive ratemaking. The Court failed to note the 
difference between a change in the general rate charged tariff 
customers and the type of accounting adjustment allowed by the 
PSC Order. UP&L sought one-time relief from the penalty 
imposed by the EBA system because of its unexpectedly high 
non-tariff sales and did not seek an increase in the general 
rates charged tariff customers. 
Without the modification made by the PSC's Order, the 
EBA system provides a disincentive to make non-tariff sales. 
By applying the entire amount of all non-tariff revenues 
(instead of only that portion of those revenues which is equal 
to the energy costs of producing those revenues) as a general 
-4-
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offset against energy costs, the EBA system produces an 
economic penalty to the utility which attempts to keep costly 
facilities in use in times of reduced demand by tariff 
ratepayers. By stopping or reducing production from its 
facilities during such times, UP&L could reduce operating costs 
and net revenue losses. The EBA system, as applied without the 
modification made in the PSC Order, penalizes the utility which 
keeps its facilities in operation and aggressively sells the 
excess capacity to non-tariff ratepayers. UP&L submits that it 
is anomalous, in the name of protecting against inefficiency, 
to strike down a procedure which protects against inefficiency. 
The accounting adjustment proposed by UP&L is 
analogous to the accounting adjustment ordered by the 
California Public Utility Commission in Southern California 
Edison Co., 576 P.2d 945, cited in the Opinion. In each case 
there was an unusual one-time surfeit of funds in the energy 
balancing account. In each case, absent some adjustment, one 
group, either ratepayer or shareholder, would be unfairly 
o 
penalized. In Southern California Edison the Court 
2
 In Southern California Edison, the adjustment was 
necessitated by excess revenues in the fuel adjustment account 
caused by a change in tax accounting procedure that resulted in 
one-time, significant profits to the company. The Supreme 
Court of California allowed a one-time accounting modification 
to pass some of the benefit on to ratepayers. 
-5-
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< 
determined that such a one-time accounting modification was 
merely an equitable adjustment and did not constitute 
retroactive ratemaking. 
In the Opinion, the Court noted its assumption "that 
the EBA order was promulgated under the Commission's ample 
general power to fix rates and establish accounting 
procedures.- Opinion at 6, n. 4. The Court described the EBA 
as 
a rather unique device for handling not only the 
utilities' unstable fuel costs, but also other cost 
and revenue items which the PSC felt were subject to 
rapid and unpredictable fluctuation. 
Opinion at 3. The Court further noted that 
ideally, over the long term, the account is 
zeroed out, i.e., the revenues flowing into 
the account will equal the expenditures 
charged to it. Thus, the EBA accomplishes 
the purpose of the pass-through legislation 
to allow expeditious rate response to those 
elements of cost which are subject to 
frequent fluctuation, and it does so without 
bypassing the more formal requirements of 
general rate making. 
Opinion at 4. If the EBA is recognized as principally an 
accounting device of the PSC to implement general pass-through 
legislation, it follows that the PSC should be able to 
authorize changes in the accounting procedure to allow that 
procedure to more accurately reflect proper allocations of 
-6-
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energy costs. The Commission must have the continuing power 
and responsibility to administer and improve the EBA system. 
At the time the EBA was created, the PSC contemplated that 
accounting adjustments would need to be made periodically to 
correct inaccuracies in the accounting procedures. See, In Re 
Application of Utah Power & Light Co., Nos. 78-035-21 and 
79-035-03, slip op. at 16 (P.S.C. Utah July 20, 1979). In 
furtherance of this continuing power and responsibility, the 
PSC has, in the PSC Order and in the Mountain Fuel case, supra, 
encouraged and directed these parties, the Division of Public 
Utilities and "other interested parties" to consider the 
solutions to the inequitable results which occur in the EBA. 
PSC Order, No. 82-035-14 )P.S.C. Utah Dec. 30, 1982); Mountain 
Fuel case, supra, at 6. 
Since the EBA is intended to be "zeroed out" on a 
periodic basis, it is essentially an account balancing 
mechanism designed to achieve equitable adjustments and the 
fair and equitable exercise by the Commission of its general 
powers on a continuing basis. Under the Court's decision this 
purpose is frustrated by a rigid and inviolate application of 
the rule against "retroactive ratemaking." UP&L submits that 
the Court's decision effectively emasculates the EBA system and 
precludes it from being fairly administered. 
-7-
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( 
B. Even if the Court Does Deem the Modifications to 
the EBA Account to be Retroactive Ratemaking, UP&L Believes 
that the Court Should have Allowed An Exception to the General 
Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking. 
The prohibition against retroactive ratemaking is not { 
absolute. "The spectre of retroactive ratemaking must not be 
viewed as a talismatic inhibition against the application of 
principles based upon equity and common sense." Roberts v. ' 
Narragansett Electric Co., #82-156-M.P., slip, op. at 5 (R.I., 
Jan 11, 1984). The court in its Opinion recognized the 
possibility of exceptions, at least implicitly, when it stated 
the rule that utilities "are generally not permitted to adjust 
their rates retroactively to compensate for unanticipated costs 
or unrealized revenues.H Opinion at 2 (emphasis added). The 
key factor in determining whether to apply the rule against 
retroactive ratemaking should be whether application of the 
rule will further the public policy rationales underlying the 
rule, or will ultimately frustrate those rationales. 
The real fear behind retroactive ratemaking is that 
Mif a utility's income were guaranteed, the company would lose 
all incentive to operate in an efficient, cost-effective 
manner, thereby leading to higher operating costs and eventual 
rate increases.- Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 415 A.2d 
177, (R.I. 1980). It is that public policy of stimulating 
efficiency that should guide the court in determining whether 
to apply the rule prohibiting retroactive ratemaking. 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A great many states have recognized that utilities 
should be allowed retroactive rate increases to offset the 
effects of unusual circumstances such as freak winter storms. 
See, e.g.. Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 415 A.2d 177, 
(R.I. 1980) (citing cases from Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania.) The one-time accounting 
adjustment sought by UP&L is prompted by an analogous unusual 
circumstance. In each of these cases: the change in revenue 
or expenses was a result of an unforeseen and unforeseeable 
circumstance; the utility did its best to mitigate the negative 
effects of the situation and to operate as efficiently as 
possible; and the purpose of the accounting adjustment was to 
spread the risk associated with the incident fairly between the 
shareholders and the ratepayers. 
Application of the rule against retroactive ratemaking 
in this case does not further any of the public policies behind 
the general rule. A rigid application of the general rule 
against retroactive ratemaking in this case situation will 
discourage attempts to market excess generation capacity and 
actually defeat the purpose of the rule. This reality is 
illustrated by the following statement of the court in 
Narragansett: 
-9-
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( 
The next time a storm of this magnitude 
occurs, the company would have no incentive 
to hire outside line and tree crews to 
restore service efficiently and swiftly to 
customers if no reimbursement for 
extraordinary expenses would be * 
forthcoming. Thus, application of the rule 
to expenses related to such an emergency 
situation so inexorably related to the 
public health and safety would serve to 
thwart the goal of efficient customer 
service. ' 
Narraaansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 415 A.2d at 179. This 
Court should recognize an exception to the general rule against 
retroactive ratemaking in extraordinary situations such as the 
one presented in the present case. 
The Court's holding that the rule against retroactive 
ratemaking precludes the adjustment to the EBA allowed by the 
PSC Order fails to recognize that the effect of the EBA system 
and the Court's ruling in this case is to retroactively reduce 
the rates to the ratepayers by the entire amount of UP&L's 
non-tariff revenues during the Relevant Period (less the amount 
thereof allocated to defray energy costs). Thus, it is not a 
question of whether or not "retroactive ratemaking" has or has 
not occurred but whether or not UP&L is to be penalized for its 
efforts to earn non-tariff revenues from which the ratepayers 
can be benefited. Had UP&L not utilized its facilities to make 
non-tariff sales there would have been no resulting benefit 
available to the ratepayers. Fairness requires that UP&L not 
be penalized for its effort to avoid this result. 
-10-
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POINT II 
THE
 DEciSION OF THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILS TO 
CONSIDER THE PSC ORDER IN IN RE THE APPLICATION OF 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, No. 81-057-19 slip op. 
(P F.C. Utah Ana. 2. lQr^> 
opini, .. ;... v^srt stated: 
Neither the facts nor the opii.^n 1-
Application of Mountain Fuel Supply to 
Adjust the Base Rate for Natural Gas 
Services in Utah, Case No. 81-057-19, cit«: " 
by the PSC as precedent for this action, 
in the record, and that case apparently * 
not appealed to this Court. Therefore, w = -
are unable to determine if there were 
similar circumstances or if, in fact, an 
identical diversion of funds wd& allowed. 
Opinion at '» 11 •! 
The Mountain Fuel case should have been r:onsid',j» <'jri 'hy 
t h e Courf borrius^ mi i in ,'• ossein, i a i il |.< i i i en i i ca i lo ihti p r e sen t 
case on i t s tcicts cii'inl! is an important precedent and statement 
of -he p o l i c y of the PSC in adminis ter nu| I hi-1 F!F<A iiysln In 
Mountain FueJ di- i. ii • s c a s e , the PSC allowed n o n - t a r i f f 
revenues which weie c r e d i t e d to an energy ba lanc ing account 
(Mountain Furl Supply Accounl fh MM) I br I iiin.sh-.M i Il I <» 
i t f i "I'lenei «J J in i "\;II fiiii i a c c o u n t s , A a in I h e p r e s e n t r , i . , PI u n t a i n 
Fuel had su f fe red s i g n i f i c a n t l o s s e s from i e d u c t i o n s in demand 
by t a r i f f jratopaye • t in i I Ii i Id t ihi»r ,>l hose 
I'eiJi l i o n s , I .lis niiMJi! e f f o i l s to gene ra t e s i g n i f i c a n t 
non- tariff sales revenues (i.e., revenues from various 
-II-
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( 
transportation arrangements, sales for resale, and the sale of 
liquid hydrocarbons)• It also sought to have the EBA 
procedures modified to allow a portion of these non-tariff 
i 
revenues to be transferred to its general revenue account. In 
approving the stipulation between the Division and Mountain 
Fuel allowing this adjustment, the PSC noted that in a previous 
Mountain Fuel Supply matter (Case No. 80-057-10), it had 
specifically authorized Mountain Fuel to: 
petition this commission for exceptions to 
balancing account treatment for "other 
revenues," if in the company's opinion other 
treatment is warranted. Such requests will 
be considered on a case by case basis and 
will take into account financial stability 
of the company. 
Mountain Fuel, at 5. 
Fairness and consistency in administering the EBA 
system requires that UP&L be allowed the same kind of 
adjustment in its EBA with respect to the unusually high 
non-tariff revenues received by it during the unusual 
circumstances which existed during the Relevant Period as 
Mountain Fuel was allowed under similar circumstances during 
essentially the same period. The Court should consider the 
Mountain Fuel case as an additional reason for treating the PSC 
Order as something other than "retroactive ratemaking" or as an 
exception to the general rule against retroactive ratemaking. 
-12-
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Mounta in F u e l ra°^ **•"*'- * 4 
, , 4 -» t i UP&L 
^ u o u i . o L . y •- . l e v v d : n u t th» - ' ^ ; i ; / i i r . F u e l c ^ s e * * - p r o p e r l y 
b e f r e t h e *-IT- ^ n H s , r yw~ * ? MII II 
i - oi< s A. p h y s i c a l , ' / i n c l u d e c 
r e ^ ">r'• * r u i t c a n c a s 
hpr rnnrf xr. a*' i~ : ? ! -ere 
reterrec • '.*• i- ' l *. ' phvsi^^l !^? ^ * i ' 
record 2 Suther I in btatuL^iy LoiibliueLioii ', I11 .
 VJ M« I"1 
1 w II As a convenience to the Court j UI hi lm,s attached a copy 
of i he M o m u ain Fuel case to Luis petition as ADOI'MIII i n 
J
 Brief of inter venor Utah Power & Light Co. at 4, 
tah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Services 
Commission, Nos. 19361 & 19362, slip op. (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) ; In Re 
Application of Utah Power & Light Co., No. 82-035-14, slip op. 
at 3 (P.S.C. Utah December 30 # 1982) (mentioning the Mountain 
Fuel case in its findings of fact); In Re Application of Utah 
Power & Light Co., No. 82-035-14, slip op. at 4 (P.S.C. Utah 
December 30, 1982) (mentioning the Mountain Fi lel case a n :i ts 
conclusions). 
;1
 It J I '&L has been unable to obtain a copy oi the 
index of the record on appeal before the Court. The clerk has 
advised it that the Court cannot locate its copy, nor does tr,. 
Public Service Commission, the Attorney General's office, c: 
the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Public 
Utilities have a copy 
• 13-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
( 
POINT III 
IF THE COURT CANNOT AFFIRM THE PSC ORDER BECAUSE OF 
INADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CONCERNING THE EBA, IT SHOULD REMAND THESE CASES FOR
 { 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO 
BE MADE BY THE PSC. 
UP&L urges the Court in this Petition to affirm the 
PSC Order and preserve the equitable balancing effect and 
application of the EBA system. Alternatively/ in the event the 
Court feels that the PSC Order does not contain sufficient 
findings and conclusions about the EBA for the Court to 
entirely affirm the PSC Order, UP&L urges the Court to remand 
these cases to the PSC with direction to make such findings and 
conclusions. 
The threshold question in an administrative 
appeal is whether the record is adequate to 
permit meaningful judicial review. If it is 
not, and the basis of an administrative 
decision is unclear, it may be necessary to 
remand the case for preparation of a record 
revealing the agency's reasoning process. 
Only by focusing on the relationship between 
evidence and findings, and between findings 
and ultimate action, can we determine 
whether the agency's action is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
White v. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, 678 P.2d 
1319, 1322 (Alaska 1984) (citations omitted). The court may 
raise the question of the adequacy of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law by the administrative agency on its own 
-14-
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APPENDIX A 
- BEE • : R E THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter 01 tr:e r ppl i ca 
tion of MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY 
COMPANY to Adjust Base Rates 
for Natural Gas Service in 
Utah. 
CASE NO. 81-057-19 
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Assistant Attorney 
General 
•For Mountain Fuel Suppl ) -
Company 
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State of Utah 
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and Mountain Fuel Resources in connection with the Clay Basin 
storage field; (3) "regular" increases in the cost of gas 
purchased from pipeline and field suppliers; and (4) an amorti-
zation of the resultant year-end unrecovered balance in Account 
191 • 
The composite effect of the Company's requests, as reflected 
in its December 16, 1981, application, would have been to raise 
rates to its Utah customers by approximately $23.6 million* On 
December 24, 1981, the Commission approved a tentative increase 
in the Company's rates that
 § resulted in an annual increase of 
approximately $9.1 million, pending the resolution of several 
issues that had been raised by the Division of Public Utilities 
(Division)• 
Subsequent to the Company's December 16 filing for relief in 
this case and the Commission's Report and Tentative Order based 
on that application, the Commission issued an order approving a 
comprehensive settlement in the "Wexpro Case," Case No. 76-
057-14, et al. (Wexpro Order). At the hearings held in connec-
tion with this pass-through case, Mountain Fuel filed information 
and amended exhibits that reflected, among other things, the 
adjustments to rates as required by the conditions and provisions 
of the Wexpro Order* 
Hearings were held pursuant to notice on January 12-14, 
1982, at which Mountain Fuel presented testimony and evidence 
concerning its requests. At a hearing on February 4, 1982, the 
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who are subject to incremental pricing under Title II of the 
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, and (b) $18,165,000 as a direct 
offset to gas costs, to be implemented over approximately a 
12-month period on a commodity basis"through the use of Account 
191. 
2. Champlin Plant' Revenues. One source of revenues that 
affects the determination of Mountain Fuel's gas costs to be 
recovered in rates is the revenue received by the Company under 
the Btu "make-whole" provisions of an arrangement with Chaanplin 
Oil Company in connection with removal of liquid hydrocarbons 
from certain gas purchased by Mountain Fuel and transported 
through its system. The Stipulation specified a modification of 
the Company's estimate of those revenues for the test year 1982. 
3. Clay Basin Storage Field Costs. In connection with 
storage service obtained by Mountain Fuel in the Clay Basin 
storage field in northern Utah, we find that it is appropriate 
that the costs incurred in connection with such service should be 
recovered by the Company and reflected in its rates. We farther 
find that the costs incurred since May lf 1981, pursuant to 
tariffs approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 
its Docket No. CP81-325, are appropriately recovered by the 
Company through its 191 Account mechanism, as agreed to by the 
Division and the Company in the Stipulation. We do not, by this 
finding, decide the issue of prospective treatinent of these costs 
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by other means, as raised by the Division in Case No. 81-057-17, 
currently pending. 
4. Other Revenues. In Case No. 80-057-10, this Commission 
ordered that, as a general practice*, Mountain Fuel would make 
direct credit offsets to its gas costs through the 191 Account 
for all revenues received from certain transactions denoted as 
"Other Revenues." These include the revenues from various 
transportation arrangements, sales for resaler and the sale of 
liquid hydrocarbons. However, in our April 7, 1981, order in 
that case, we also indicated that: 
[T]he applicant may petition this Coamission 
for exceptions to balancing account treatment 
for "other revenues," if in the Company's 
opinion other treatment is warranted. Such 
requests will be considered on a case by case 
basis and will take into account financial. 
stability of the Company. 
Pursuant to that provision, Mountain Fuel included in its 
December 16 application in this case a request that some $7.3 
million in Other Revenues received during 1981 be excluded from 
direct crediting to Account 191. The Company founded its request 
in large part on the low rate of return exhibited for the utility 
operations of the Company during 1981. 
The Stipulation resolves this by permitting Mountain Fuel to 
exclude $2.65 million in July-December 1981 Other Revenues from 
being credited to Account 191. The Company has agreed to include 
as 191 Account credits approximately $1.31 million in temporary 
transportation revenues received in early 1981• We find that 
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this treatment of the Other Revenue issues constitutes an appro-
priate resolution under the circumstances and is in the public 
interest. We also encourage the Company and the Division to 
explore, discuss and present to the* Commission a proposal for 
guidelines or specific treatment of Other Revenues in the future, 
as set forth in the Stipulation. 
Because the Other Revenue issues were settled by- the 
Stipulation, the Commission finds it unnecessary to set forth in 
any more detail any guidelines and considerations that would form 
the basis for future treatment of Other Revenues. 
5. Composite Result. Although Mountain Fuel's original 
application was for an overall increase in rates of $.21843/dth, 
the intervening approval and implementation of the terms of the 
Wexpro Orderr the use of the actual year-end balance in Account 
191 (including the reflection of the stipulated treatment of the 
1981 Other Revenues issues)
 f and the revised estimate of 
"make-whole" revenues from Champlin Oil Co. xesult in a net 
reduction in rates related to gas costs and •Wexpro Case* 
adjustments of $.30662/dth. 
6. December 24 Tentative Order. To the extent not incon-
sistent with the terms and conditions of the Stipulation pre-
mted to the Commission on February 4, 1982# and ratified by 
Ks Order, we adopt and ratify the findings and conclusions set' 
forth in the Report and Tentative Order in this case issued on 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Costs incurred by Mountain Fuel on and after May 1, 
1981, pursuant to FERC tariffs in connection with natural gas 
storage service in the Clay Basin storage field, have been 
properly incurred in connection with providing utility service to 
Utah consumersf and the costs for which Mountain Fuel initially 
sought coverage in this case and which were stipulated to by the 
Company and the Division are appropriately treated through 
Account 191. These costs have been incurred for the purposes of 
obtaining energy from independent contractors or suppliers whose 
prices are prescribed by FERC tariff. This conclusion does not 
preclude the Commission from according these costs general-rate-
case treatment in a future period, should it subsequently be 
demonstrated that such alternate treatment would be warranted. 
However, costs incurred prior to an order of this Commission 
effecting such a change will be recovered through the 191 Account 
process and will not be subject to later disapproval. 
2. Rates for natural gas service that reflect the various 
elements, adjustments and reductions set forth in the Stipulation 
approved by this Order are just and reasonable. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Commission hereby enters the following: 
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ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the schedules of 
rates and charges for natural gas service in Utah heretofore 
filed by Mountain Fuel Supply Company*on February 5, 1982, to be 
effective February 1, 1982, in connection with the Commissions 
February 5 bench ruling approving the Stipulation are hereby 
approved. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 2nd day of August, 1982. 
/s/ Milly O. Bernard, Chairman 
(SEAL) /s/ David R. Irviney Commissioner 
/s/ Brent H. Cameron, Commissioner 
Attest: 
/s/ Jean Mowrey, Secretary 
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